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OPINION  
  
 
 
Fuentes, Circuit Judge    
 
 The United States Trustee, Region 3 (“Trustee”), 
appeals the reversal by the District Court of sanctions 
originally imposed in the bankruptcy court on attorneys Mark 
3 
 
J. Udren and Lorraine Doyle, the Udren Law Firm, and 
HSBC for violations of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy 
Procedure 9011.  For the reasons given below, we will 
reverse the District Court and affirm the bankruptcy court‟s 
imposition of sanctions with respect to Lorraine Doyle, the 
Udren Law Firm, and HSBC.
1
  However, we will affirm the 
District Court‟s reversal of the bankruptcy court‟s sanctions 
with respect to Mark J. Udren.  
 
I. 
 
A.  Background 
 
 This case is an unfortunate example of the ways in 
which overreliance on computerized processes in a high-
volume practice, as well as a failure on the part of clients and 
lawyers alike to take responsibility for accurate knowledge of 
a case, can lead to attorney misconduct before a court.  It 
arises from the bankruptcy proceeding of Mr. and Ms. Niles 
C. and Angela J. Taylor.  The Taylors filed for a Chapter 13 
bankruptcy in September 2007.  In the Taylors‟ bankruptcy 
petition, they listed the bank HSBC, which held the mortgage 
on their house, as a creditor.  In turn, HSBC filed a proof of 
claim in October 2007 with the bankruptcy court.   
 
We are primarily concerned with two pleadings that 
HSBC‟s attorneys filed in the bankruptcy court—(1) the 
request for relief from the automatic stay which would have 
permitted HSBC to pursue foreclosure proceedings despite 
the Taylors‟ bankruptcy filing and (2) the response to the 
                                              
1
 Although HSBC was sanctioned by the bankruptcy court, it 
did not participate in this appeal. 
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Taylors‟ objection to HSBC‟s proof of claim.  We are also 
concerned with the attorneys‟ conduct in court in connection 
with those pleadings.  We draw our facts from the findings of 
the bankruptcy court. 
 
1. The proof of claim (Moss Codilis law 
firm) 
 
 To preserve its interest in a debtor‟s estate in a 
personal bankruptcy case, a creditor must file with the court a 
proof of claim, which includes a statement of the claim and of 
its amount and supporting documentation.  Tennessee Student 
Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 447 (2004); Fed. R. 
Bank. P. 3001; Official Bankruptcy Form 10.  In October 
2007, HSBC filed such a proof of claim with respect to the 
Taylors‟ mortgage.  To do so, it used the law firm Moss 
Codilis.
2
  Moss retrieved the information on which the claim 
was based from HSBC‟s computerized mortgage servicing 
database.  No employee of HSBC reviewed the claim before 
filing.   
 
This proof of claim contained several errors: the 
amount of the Taylors‟ monthly payment was incorrectly 
stated, the wrong mortgage note was attached, and the value 
                                              
2
 Moss Codilis is not involved in the present appeal.  
However, it is worth noting that the firm has come under 
serious judicial criticism for its lax practices in bankruptcy 
proceedings.  “In total, [the court knows] of 23 instances in 
which [Moss Codilis] has violated [court rules] in this District 
alone.”  In re Greco, 405 B.R. 393, 394 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 
2009); see also In re Waring, 401 B.R. 906 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ohio 2009).   
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of the home was understated by about $100,000.  It is not 
clear whether the errors originated in HSBC‟s database or 
whether they were introduced in Moss Codilis‟s filing.3   
 
2. The motion for relief from stay 
 
At the time of the bankruptcy proceeding, the Taylors 
were also involved in a payment dispute with HSBC.  HSBC 
believed the Taylors‟ home to be in a flood zone and had 
obtained “forced insurance” for the property, the cost of 
which (approximately $180/month) it passed on to the 
Taylors.  The Taylors disputed HSBC‟s position and 
continued to pay their regular mortgage payment, without the 
additional insurance costs.
4
  HSBC failed to acknowledge that 
the Taylors were making their regular payments and instead 
treated each payment as a partial payment, so that, in its 
records, the Taylors were becoming more delinquent each 
month. 
 
Ordinarily, the filing of a bankruptcy petition imposes 
an automatic stay on all debt collection activities, including 
foreclosures.  McCartney v. Integra Nat’l Bank North, 106 
F.3d 506, 509 (3d Cir. 1997).  However, pursuant to 11 
U.S.C. § 362(d)(1), a secured creditor may file for relief from 
the stay “for cause, including the lack of adequate protection 
of an interest in property” of the creditor, in order to permit it 
to commence or continue foreclosure proceedings.  Because 
                                              
3
 HSBC ultimately corrected these errors in an amended court 
filing. 
4
 This dispute has now been resolved in favor of the Taylors.  
(App. 199.) 
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of the Taylors‟ withheld insurance payments, HSBC‟s records 
indicated that they were delinquent.  Thus, in January 2008, 
HSBC retained the Udren Firm to seek relief from the stay. 
   
Mr. Udren is the only partner of the Udren Firm; Ms. 
Doyle, who appeared for the Udren Firm in the Taylors‟ case, 
is a managing attorney at the firm, with twenty-seven years of 
experience.  HSBC does not deign to communicate directly 
with the firms it employs in its high-volume foreclosure 
work; rather, it uses a computerized system called NewTrak 
(provided by a third party, LPS) to assign individual firms 
discrete assignments and provide the limited data the system 
deems relevant to each assignment.
5
  The firms are selected 
and the instructions generated without any direct human 
involvement.  The firms so chosen generally do not have the 
capacity to check the data (such as the amount of mortgage 
payment or time in arrears) provided to them by NewTrak 
and are not expected to communicate with other firms that 
may have done related work on the matter.  Although it is 
technically possible for a firm hired through NewTrak to 
contact HSBC to discuss the matter on which it has been 
retained, it is clear from the record that this was discouraged 
                                              
5
 LPS is also not involved in the present appeal, as the 
bankruptcy court found that it had not engaged in wrongdoing 
in this case.  However, both the accuracy of its data and the 
ethics of its practices have been repeatedly called into 
question elsewhere.  See, e.g., In re Wilson, 2011 WL 
1337240 at *9 (Bankr. E.D.La. Apr. 7, 2011) (imposing 
sanctions after finding that LPS had issued “sham” affidavits 
and perpetrated fraud on the court); In re Thorne, 2011 WL 
2470114 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. June 16, 2011); In re Doble, 
2011 WL 1465559 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2011). 
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and that some attorneys, including at least one Udren Firm 
attorney, did not believe it to be permitted.   
 
In the Taylors‟ case, NewTrak provided the Udren 
Firm with only the loan number, the Taylors‟ name and 
address, payment amounts, late fees, and amounts past due.  It 
did not provide any correspondence with the Taylors 
concerning the flood insurance dispute.   
 
In January 2008, Doyle filed the motion for relief from 
the stay.  This motion was prepared by non-attorney 
employees of the Udren Firm, relying exclusively on the 
information provided by NewTrak.  The motion said that the 
debtor “has failed to discharge arrearages on said mortgage or 
has failed to make the current monthly payments on said 
mortgage since” the filing of the bankruptcy petition.  (App. 
65.)  It identified “the failure to make . . . post-petition 
monthly payments” as stretching from November 1, 2007 to 
January 15, 2008, with an “amount per month” of $1455 (a 
monthly payment higher than that identified on the proof of 
claim filed earlier in the case by the Moss firm) and a total in 
arrears of $4367.  (App. 66.)  (It did note a “suspense 
balance” of $1040, which it subtracted from the ultimate total 
sought from the Taylors, but with no further explanation.)  It 
stated that the Taylors had “inconsequential or no equity” in 
the property.
6
  Id.  The motion never mentioned the flood 
insurance dispute.  
                                              
6
 The U.S. Trustee now points out that the motion also 
claimed that the Taylors were not making payments to other 
creditors under their bankruptcy plan and argues that this 
claim was false as well.  Since the bankruptcy court did not 
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Doyle did nothing to verify the information in the 
motion for relief from stay besides check it against “screen 
prints” of the NewTrak information.  She did not even access 
NewTrak herself.  In effect, she simply proofread the 
document.  It does not appear that NewTrak provided the 
Udren Firm with any information concerning the Taylors‟ 
equity in their home, so Doyle could not have verified her 
statement in the motion concerning the lack of equity in any 
way, even against a “screen print.” 
 
At the same time as it filed for relief from the stay, the 
Udren Firm also served the Taylors with a set of requests for 
admission (pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 
7036, incorporating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36) 
(“RFAs”).  The RFAs sought formal and binding admissions 
that the Taylors had made no mortgage payments from 
November 2007 to January 2008 and that they had no equity 
in their home.   
   
In February 2008, the Taylors filed a response to the 
motion for relief from stay, denying that they had failed to 
make payments and attaching copies of six checks tendered to 
HSBC during the relevant period.  Four of them had already 
been cashed by HSBC.
7
  
                                                                                                                                                  
make any findings with respect to this issue, we will not 
consider it.  
7
 It is not clear from the briefing whether the last two checks, 
for February and March 2008, had actually been submitted to 
HSBC at the time the motion was filed; appellees deny that 
they were.  However, appellees do not dispute that checks for 
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3. The claim objection and the response 
to the claim objection 
 
In March 2008, the Taylors also filed an objection to 
HSBC‟s proof of claim.  The objection stated that HSBC had 
misstated the payment due on the mortgage and pointed out 
the dispute over the flood insurance.  However, the Taylors 
did not respond to HSBC‟s RFAs.  Unless a party responds 
properly to a request  for admission within 30 days, the 
“matter is [deemed] admitted.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3). 
 
In the same month, Doyle filed a response to the 
objection to the proof of claim.  The response did not discuss 
the flood insurance issue at all.  However, it stated that “[a]ll 
figures contained in the proof of claim accurately reflect 
actual sums expended . . . by Mortgagee . . . and/or charges to 
which Mortgagee is contractually entitled and which the 
Debtors are contractually obligated to pay.”  (App. 91.)  This 
was indisputably incorrect, because the proof of claim listed 
an inaccurate monthly mortgage payment (which was also a 
different figure from the payment listed in Doyle‟s own 
motion for relief from stay).   
 
4. The claim hearings 
 
In May 2008, the bankruptcy court held a hearing on 
both the motion for relief and the claim objection.  HSBC was 
represented at the hearing by a junior associate at the Udren 
Firm, Mr. Fitzgibbon.  At that hearing, Fitzgibbon ultimately 
                                                                                                                                                  
October and November 2007 and January 2008 had been 
cashed.   
10 
 
admitted that, at the time the motion for relief from the stay 
was filed, HSBC had received a mortgage payment for 
November 2007, even though both the motion for stay and the 
response to the Taylors‟ objection to the proof of claim stated 
otherwise.
8
  Despite this, Fitzgibbon urged the court to grant 
the relief from stay, because the Taylors had not responded to 
HSBC‟s RFAs (which included the “admission” that the 
Taylors had not made payments from November 2007 to 
January 2008).  It appears from the record that Fitzgibbon 
initially sought to have the RFAs admitted as evidence even 
though he knew they contained falsehoods.  (App. 101-102.)
9
   
 
 
                                              
8
 Appellees concede that, by the time the May hearing was 
held, HSBC had received all of the relevant checks. 
9
 Appellees now claim that “[i]t is clear from the record, that 
Mr. Fitzgibbon honestly disclosed to the Court that these 
checks had just been received by [the] Udren [Firm] and that 
the only issue was that of flood insurance.”  (App‟ee Br. 16.)  
However, this disclosure did not occur until after Fitzgibbon 
had attempted to enter the RFAs, which made contrary 
claims, as evidence, and debtor‟s counsel raised the issue.  As 
the bankruptcy court described it, “[Fitzgibbon] first argued 
that I should rule in HSBC‟s favor . . . On probing by the 
court, he acknowledged that as of the date of the continued 
hearing, he had learned that [the Taylors] had made every 
payment.”  (App. 196, emphasis added.)  In a Rule 9011/11 
proceeding such as the present one, one would expect the 
challenged parties to be scrupulously careful in their 
representations to the court.    
11 
 
The bankruptcy court denied the request to enter the 
RFAs as evidence, noting that the firm “closed their eyes to 
the fact that there was evidence that . . . conflicted with the 
very admissions that they asked me [to deem admitted].  They 
. . . had that evidence [that the assertions in its motion were 
not accurate] in [their] possession and [they] went ahead like 
[they] never saw it.”  (App. 108-109.)  The court noted: 
Maybe they have somebody there churning out 
these motions that doesn‟t talk to the people 
that—you know, you never see the records, do 
you?  Somebody sends it to you that sent it 
from somebody else. 
 
(App. 109.)  “I really find this motion to be in questionable 
good faith,” the court concluded.  (App. 112.) 
 
After the hearing, the bankruptcy court directed the 
Udren Firm to obtain an accounting from HSBC of the 
Taylors‟ prepetition payments so that the arrearage on the 
mortgage could be determined correctly.  At the next hearing, 
in June 2008, Fitzgibbon stated that he could not obtain an 
accounting from HSBC, though he had repeatedly placed 
requests via NewTrak.  He told the court that he was literally 
unable to contact HSBC—his firm‟s client—directly to verify 
information which his firm had already represented to the 
court that it believed to be true. 
 
At the end of the June 2008 hearing, the court told 
Fitzgibbon: “I‟m issuing an order to show cause on your firm, 
too, for filing these things . . . without having any knowledge.  
And filing answers . . . without any knowledge.”  (App. 119.)  
Thereafter, the court entered an order sua sponte dated June 
12 
 
9, 2008, directing Fitzgibbon, Doyle, Udren, and others to 
appear and give testimony concerning the possibility of 
sanctions.  
  
5. The sanctions hearings 
 
The order stated that the purpose of the hearing 
included “to investigate the practices employed in this case by 
HSBC and its attorneys and agents and consider whether 
sanctions should issue against HSBC, its attorneys and 
agents.”  (App 96-98.)  Among those practices were “pressing 
a relief motion on admissions that were known to be untrue, 
and signing and filing pleadings without knowledge or 
inquiry regarding the matters pled therein.”  Id.  The order 
noted that “[t]he details are identified on the record of the 
hearings which are incorporated herein.”  Id.  In ordering 
Doyle to appear, the order noted that “the motion for relief, 
the admissions and the reply to the objection were prepared 
over Doyle‟s name and signature.”  Id.  However, this order 
was not formally identified as “an order to show cause.”   
 
The bankruptcy court held four hearings over several 
days, making in-depth inquiries into the communications 
between HSBC and its lawyers in this case, as well as the 
general capabilities and limitations of a system like NewTrak.  
Ultimately, it found that the following had violated Rule 
9011: Fitzgibbon, for pressing the motion for relief based on 
claims he knew to be untrue; Doyle, for failing to make 
reasonable inquiry concerning the representations she made in 
the motion for relief from stay and the response to the claim 
objection; Udren and the Udren Firm itself, for the conduct of 
its attorneys; and HSBC, for practices which caused the 
failure to adhere to Rule 9011.  
13 
 
  
Because of his inexperience, the court did not sanction 
Fitzgibbon.  However, it required Doyle to take 3 CLE credits 
in professional responsibility; Udren himself to be trained in 
the use of NewTrak and to spend a day observing his 
employees handling NewTrak; and both Doyle and Udren to 
conduct a training session for the firm‟s relevant lawyers in 
the requirements of Rule 9011 and procedures for escalating 
inquiries on NewTrak.  The court also required HSBC to send 
a copy of its opinion to all the law firms it uses in bankruptcy 
proceedings, along with a letter explaining that direct contact 
with HSBC concerning matters relating to HSBC‟s case was 
permissible.
10
  
 
B. The District Court’s Decision 
 
Udren, Doyle, and the Udren Firm (but not HSBC) 
appealed the sanctions order to the District Court, which 
ultimately overturned the order.  The District Court‟s decision 
was based on three considerations: that the confusion in the 
case was attributable at least as much to the actions of 
                                              
10
 Taylor‟s counsel was also ultimately sanctioned and 
removed from the case.  Counsel did not perform 
competently, as is evidenced by the Taylors‟ failure to contest 
HSBC‟s RFAs.  She also made a number of inaccurate 
statements in her  representations to the court.  However, it is 
clear that her conduct did not induce the misrepresentations 
by HSBC or its attorneys.  As the bankruptcy court correctly 
noted, “the process employed by a mortgagee and its counsel 
must be fair and transparent without regard to the quality of 
debtor‟s counsel since many debtors are unrepresented and 
cannot rely on counsel to protect them.”  (App. 214.)  
14 
 
Taylor‟s counsel as to Doyle, Udren, and the Udren Firm; that 
the bankruptcy court seemed more concerned with “sending a 
message” to the bar concerning the use of computerized 
systems than with the conduct in the particular case; and that, 
since Udren himself did not sign any of the filings containing 
misrepresentations, he could not be sanctioned under Rule 
9011.  Although HSBC had not appealed, the District Court 
overturned the order with respect to HSBC, as well.   
 
The United States trustee then appealed the District 
Court‟s decision to this court.11 
 
II. 
 
 Rule 9011 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy 
Procedure, the equivalent of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, requires that parties making representations 
to the court certify that “the allegations and other factual 
contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so 
identified, are likely to have evidentiary support.”  Fed. R. 
Bank. P. 9011(b)(3).
12
  A party must reach this conclusion 
based on “inquiry reasonable under the circumstances.”  Fed. 
R. Bank. P. 9011(b).  The concern of Rule 9011 is not the 
truth or falsity of the representation in itself, but rather 
whether the party making the representation reasonably 
                                              
11
 The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
157(a).  The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
158(a)(1), except as discussed below.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). 
12
 “[C]ases decided pursuant to [Fed. R. Civ. P. 11] apply to 
Rule 9011.”  In re Gioioso, 979 F.2d 956, 960 (3d Cir. 1992).   
15 
 
believed it at the time to have evidentiary support.  In 
determining whether a party has violated Rule 9011, the court 
need not find that a party who makes a false representation to 
the court acted in bad faith.  “The imposition of Rule 11 
sanctions . . . requires only a showing of objectively 
unreasonable conduct.”  Fellheimer, Eichen & Braverman, 
P.C. v. Charter Tech., Inc., 57 F.3d 1215, 1225 (3d Cir. 
1995).  We apply an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing 
the decision of the bankruptcy court.  See Cooter & Gell v. 
Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990).  However, we 
review its factual findings for clear error.  Stern v. Marshall, -
-- U.S. ---, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2627 (2011) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 
 In this opinion, we focus on several statements by 
appellees: (1) in the motion for relief from stay, the 
statements suggesting that the Taylors had failed to make 
payments on their mortgage since the filing of their 
bankruptcy petition and the identification of the months in 
which and the amount by which they were supposedly 
delinquent; (2) in the motion for relief from stay, the 
statement that the Taylors had no or inconsequential equity in 
the property; (3) in the response to the claim objection, the 
statement that the figures in the proof of claim were accurate; 
and, (4) at the first hearing, the attempt to have the requests 
for admission concerning the lack of mortgage payments 
deemed admitted.  As discussed above, all of these statements 
involved false or misleading representations to the court.
 13
  
 
                                              
13
 Appellees expend great energy in questioning the factual 
findings of the bankruptcy court, but we, like the District 
Court before us, see no error. 
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A.  Alleged literal truth 
 
 As an initial matter, the appellees‟ insistence that 
Doyle‟s and Fitzgibbon‟s statements were “literally true” 
should not exculpate them from Rule 9011 sanctions.   First, 
it should be noted that several of these claims were not, in 
fact, accurate.  There was no literal truth to the statement in 
the request for relief from stay that the Taylors had no equity 
in their home.  Doyle admitted that she made that statement 
simply as “part of the form pleading,” and “acknowledged 
having no knowledge of the value of the property and having 
made no inquiry on this subject.”  (App. 215.)  Similarly, the 
statement in the claim objection response that the figures in 
the original proof of claim were correct was false.   
 
Just as importantly, appellees cite no authority, and we 
are aware of none, which permits statements under Rule 9011 
that are literally true but actually misleading.  If the 
reasonably foreseeable effect of Doyle‟s or Fitzgibbon‟s 
representations to the bankruptcy court was to mislead the 
court, they cannot be said to have complied with Rule 9011.  
See Williamson v. Recovery Ltd. P’ship, 542 F.3d 43, 51 (2d 
Cir. 2008) (a party violates Rule 11 “by making false, 
misleading, improper, or frivolous representations to the 
court”) (emphasis added).  
  
In particular, even assuming that Doyle‟s and 
Fitzgibbon‟s statements as to the payments made by the 
Taylors were literally accurate, they were misleading.  In 
attempting to evaluate whether HSBC was justified in seeking 
a relief from the stay on foreclosure, the court needed to 
know that at least partial payments had been made and that 
the failure to make some of the rest of the payments was due 
17 
 
to a bona fide dispute over the amount due, not simple 
default.  Instead, the court was told only that the Taylors had 
“failed to make regular mortgage payments” from November 
1, 2007 to January 15, 2008, with a mysterious notation 
concerning a “suspense balance” following.  (App. 214-15.)  
A court could only reasonably interpret this to mean that the 
Taylors simply had not made payments for the period 
specified.  As the bankruptcy court found, “[f]or at best a 
$540 dispute, the Udren Firm mechanically prosecuted a 
motion averring a $4,367[] post-petition obligation, the aim 
of which was to allow HSBC to foreclose on [the Taylors‟] 
house.”  (App. 215.)  Therefore, Doyle‟s and Fitzgibbon‟s 
statements in question were either false or misleading. 
 
B. Reasonable inquiry 
We must, therefore, determine the reasonableness of 
the appellees‟ inquiry before they made their false 
representations.  Reasonableness has been defined as “an 
objective knowledge or belief at the time of the filing of a 
challenged paper that the claim was well-grounded in law and 
fact.”  Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 930 
F.2d 277, 289 (3d Cir. 1991) (internal quotations omitted).  
The requirement of reasonable inquiry protects not merely the 
court and adverse parties, but also the client.  The client is not 
expected to know the technical details of the law and ought to 
be able to rely on his attorney to elicit from him the 
information necessary to handle his case in the most effective, 
yet legally appropriate, manner. 
 
In determining reasonableness, we have sometimes 
looked at several factors: “the amount of time available to the 
signer for conducting the factual and legal investigation; the 
18 
 
necessity for reliance on a client for the underlying factual 
information; the plausibility of the legal position advocated; . 
. . whether the case was referred to the signer by another 
member of the Bar . . . [; and] the complexity of the legal and 
factual issues implicated.”  Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle, 
847 F.2d 90, 95 (3d Cir. 1988).  However, it does not appear 
that the court must work mechanically through these factors 
when it considers whether to impose sanctions.  Rather, it 
should consider the reasonableness of the inquiry under all 
the material circumstances.  “[T]he applicable standard is one 
of reasonableness under the circumstances.”   Bus. Guides, 
Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’ns Ents., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 551 
(1991); accord Garr v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 22 F.3d 1274, 
1279 (3d Cir. 1994).   
 
Central to this case, then, is the degree to which an 
attorney may reasonably rely on representations from her 
client.  An attorney certainly “is not always foreclosed from 
relying on information from other persons.”  Garr, 22 F.3d 
1278.  In making statements to the court, lawyers constantly 
and appropriately rely on information provided by their 
clients, especially when the facts are contained in a client‟s 
computerized records.  It is difficult to imagine how attorneys 
might function were they required to conduct an independent 
investigation of every factual representation made by a client 
before it could be included in a court filing.  While Rule 9011 
“does not recognize a „pure heart and empty head‟ defense,” 
In re Cendant Corp. Derivative Action Litig., 96 F. Supp. 2d 
403, 405 (D.N.J. 2000), a lawyer need not routinely assume 
the duplicity or gross incompetence of her client in order to 
meet the requirements of Rule 9011.  It is therefore usually 
reasonable for a lawyer to rely on information provided by a 
client, especially where that information is superficially 
19 
 
plausible and the client provides its own records which appear 
to confirm the information.   
   
However, Doyle‟s behavior was unreasonable, both as 
a matter of her general practice and in ways specific to this 
case.  First, reasonable reliance on a client‟s representations 
assumes a reasonable attempt at eliciting them by the 
attorney.  That is, an attorney must, in her independent 
professional judgment, make a reasonable effort to determine 
what facts are likely to be relevant to a particular court filing 
and to seek those facts from the client.  She cannot simply 
settle for the information her client determines in advance—
by means of an automated system, no less—that she should 
be provided with.   
 
Yet that is precisely what happened here.  “[I]t 
appears,” the bankruptcy court observed, “that Doyle, the 
manager of the Udren Firm bankruptcy department, had no 
relationship with the client, HSBC.”  (App. 202.)  By working 
solely with NewTrak, a system which no one at the Udren 
Firm seems to have understood, much less had any influence 
over, Doyle permitted HSBC to define—perilously 
narrowly—the information she had about the Taylors‟ matter.  
That HSBC was not providing her with adequate information 
through NewTrak should have been evident to Doyle from the 
face of the NewTrak file.  She did not have any information 
concerning the Taylors‟ equity in the home, though she made 
a statement specifically denying that they had any. 
   
More generally, a reasonable attorney would not file a 
motion for relief from stay for cause without inquiring of the 
client whether it had any information relevant to the alleged 
cause, that is, the debtor‟s failure to make payments.  Had 
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Doyle made even that most minimal of inquiries, HSBC 
presumably would have provided her with the information in 
its files concerning the flood insurance dispute, and Doyle 
could have included that information in her motion for relief 
from stay—or, perhaps, advised the client that seeking such a 
motion would be inappropriate under the circumstances.  
 
With respect to the Taylors‟ case in particular, Doyle 
ignored clear warning signs as to the accuracy of the data that 
she did receive.  In responding to the motion for relief from 
stay, the Taylors submitted documentation indicating that 
they had already made at least partial payments for some of 
the months in question.  In objecting to the proof of claim, the 
Taylors pointed out the inaccuracy of the mortgage payment 
listed and explained the circumstances surrounding the flood 
insurance dispute.  Although Doyle certainly was not obliged 
to accept the Taylors‟ claims at face value, they indisputably 
put her on notice that the matter was not as simple as it might 
have appeared from the NewTrak file.  At that point, any 
reasonable attorney would have sought clarification and 
further documentation from her client, in order to correct any 
prior inadvertent misstatements to the court and to avoid any 
further errors.  Instead, Doyle mechanically affirmed facts 
(the monthly mortgage payment) that her own prior filing 
with the court had already contradicted.    
 
Doyle‟s reliance on HSBC was particularly 
problematic because she was not, in fact, relying directly on 
HSBC.  Instead, she relied on a computer system run by a 
third-party vendor.  She did not know where the data 
provided by NewTrak came from.  She had no capacity to 
check the data against the original documents if any of it 
seemed implausible.  And she effectively could not question 
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the data with HSBC.  In her relationship with HSBC, Doyle 
essentially abdicated her professional judgment to a black 
box. 
 
None of the other factors discussed in the Mary Ann 
Pensiero case which are applicable here affect our analysis of 
the reasonableness of appellees‟ actions.  This was not a 
matter of extreme complexity, nor of extraordinary deadline 
pressure.   Although the initial data the Udren Firm received 
was not, in itself, wildly implausible, it was facially 
inadequate.  In short, then, we find that Doyle‟s inquiry 
before making her representations to the bankruptcy court 
was unreasonable. 
 
In making this finding, we, of course, do not mean to 
suggest that the use of computerized databases is inherently 
inappropriate.  However, the NewTrak system, as it was 
being used at the time of this case, permits parties at every 
level of the filing process to disclaim responsibility for 
inaccuracies.  HSBC has handed off responsibility to a third-
party maintainer, LPS, which, judging from the results in this 
case, has not generated particularly accurate records.  LPS 
apparently regards itself as a mere conduit of information.  
Appellees, the attorneys and final link in the chain of 
transmission of this information to the court, claim reliance 
on NewTrak‟s records.  Who, precisely, can be held 
accountable if HSBC‟s records are inadequately maintained, 
LPS transfers those records inaccurately into NewTrak, or a 
law firm relies on the NewTrak data without further 
investigation, thus leading to material misrepresentations to 
the court?  It cannot be that all the parties involved can 
insulate themselves from responsibility by the use of such a 
system.  In the end, we must hold responsible the attorneys 
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who have certified to the court that the representations they 
are making are “well-grounded in law and fact.”   
C. Notice 
 
Doyle, Udren, and the Udren Firm also argue on 
appeal that they had insufficient notice that they were in 
danger of sanctions.
14
  Rule 9011 directs that a court “[o]n its 
own initiative . . . may enter an order describing the specific 
conduct that appears to violate [the rule] and directing an 
attorney . . . to show cause why it has not violated [the rule].”  
Fed. R. Bank. P. 9011(c)(1)(B).  Due process in the 
imposition of Rule 9011 sanctions requires “particularized 
notice.”  Jones v. Pittsburgh Nat’l Corp., 899 F.2d 1350, 
1357 (3d Cir. 1990).  The meaning of “particularized notice” 
has not been rigorously defined in this circuit.  In Fellheimer, 
we noted that this requirement was met where the sanctioned 
party “was provided with sufficient, advance notice of exactly 
which conduct was alleged to be sanctionable.”  Fellheimer, 
57 F.3d at 1225.  In Simmerman v. Corino, 27 F.3d 58, 64 (3d 
Cir. 1994), we held that “the party sought to be sanctioned is 
entitled to particularized notice including, at a minimum, 1) 
the fact that Rule 11 sanctions are under consideration, 2) the 
reasons why sanctions are under consideration . . . .” 
 
The bankruptcy court‟s June order was clearly in 
substance an order to show cause, even if it was not 
                                              
14
 Any claim regarding a due process right to notification of 
the form of sanctions being considered has been waived by 
appellees, as it was not raised in their papers, either here or in 
the district court.   United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 
(3d Cir. 2005). 
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specifically captioned as such.  The more difficult question is 
whether the court adequately described “the specific conduct 
that appear[ed] to violate” Rule 9011, so as to give sufficient 
notice of “exactly which conduct was alleged to be 
sanctionable.”  As mentioned above, the court‟s June order 
identified “pressing a relief motion on admissions that were 
known to be untrue, and signing and filing pleadings without 
knowledge or inquiry regarding the matters pled therein” as 
the conduct the court wished to investigate.  (App. 119)  The 
judge also told Fitzgibbon, “I‟m issuing an order to show 
cause on your firm, too, for filing these things . . . without 
having any knowledge.  And filing answers . . . without any 
knowledge.”  Id.  The June order also made specific reference 
to “the motion for relief, the admissions and the reply to the 
objection.”   
 
In these particular circumstances, the notice given to 
appellees was sufficient to put them on notice as to which 
aspects of their conduct were considered sanctionable.  At 
that point in the case, the Udren Firm lawyers had only filed 
three substantive papers with the court—totaling six 
(substantive) pages—and the court found all of them 
problematic.  Appellees‟ claim that they believed that the 
only issue at the time of the hearing was Fitzgibbon‟s 
inability to contact HSBC is simply not plausible in light of 
the language of the June order and the bankruptcy court‟s 
statements at the hearing, which were incorporated by 
reference into the June order.  In a case in which more 
extensive docket activity had taken place, the bankruptcy 
court‟s order might not have been sufficient to inform 
appellees as to which of their filings were sanctionable, but, 
given the unusual circumstances here, it was.  But see 
Martens v. Thomann, 273 F.3d 159, 178 (2d Cir. 2001) 
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(requiring specific identification of individual challenged 
statements to uphold imposition of sanctions). 
 
 D. The Udren Firm and Udren’s individual 
liability 
 
 We also find that it was appropriate to extend 
sanctions to the Udren Firm itself.  Rule 11 explicitly allows 
the imposition of sanctions against law firms.  Fellheimer, 57 
F.3d 1215 at 1223 n.5.  In this instance, the bankruptcy court 
found that the misrepresentations in the case arose not simply 
from the irresponsibility of individual attorneys, but from the 
system put in place at the Udren Firm, which emphasized 
high-volume, high-speed processing of foreclosures to such 
an extent that it led to violations of Rule 9011.   
 
However, we do not find that responsibility for these 
failures extends specifically to Udren, whose involvement in 
this matter was limited to his role as sole shareholder of the 
firm. 
  
E. The District Court’s reversal of sanctions 
against HSBC 
 
 Ordinarily, of course, a party which does not appeal a 
decision by a district court cannot receive relief with respect 
to that decision.  “[T]he mere fact that a [party] may wind up 
with a judgment against one [party] that is not logically 
consistent with an unappealed judgment against another is not 
alone sufficient to justify taking away the unappealed 
judgment in favor of a party not before the court.”  Repola v. 
Morbark Indus., Inc., 980 F.2d 938, 942 (3d Cir. 1992).  
However, “where the disposition as to one party is 
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inextricably intertwined with the interests of a non-appealing 
party,” it may be “impossible to grant relief to one party 
without granting relief to the other.”  United States v. Tabor 
Court Realty Corp., 943 F.2d 335, 344 (3d Cir. 1991).  In 
Tabor Court Realty, a contract dispute, the assignee of a 
property had failed to appeal a decision, while the assignor 
had (and had ultimately prevailed).  Given that the dispute 
was over the disposition of the property, it was impossible to 
grant relief to the assignor without also granting relief to the 
assignee.   
 
In this instance, whether the lawyers at the Udren Firm 
violated Rule 9011 is a question analytically distinct from 
whether HSBC was responsible for any violations of Rule 
9011.  A court might find that HSBC was responsible for 
violations, whereas, say, Udren himself was not.  It was 
entirely possible for HSBC to comply with the sanctions 
ordered (a letter to its firms informing them that they are 
permitted to consult with HSBC) without affecting the 
interests of the lawyers at the Udren Firm.  Therefore, the 
interests of the lawyers at the Udren Firm and HSBC were not 
“inextricably intertwined,” and the District Court lacked 
jurisdiction to reverse the sanctions against HSBC. 
  
F. Alternative basis for the District Court’s 
decision 
 
 In reversing the bankruptcy court‟s decision, the 
District Court focused on that court‟s apparent attention to the 
broader problems of high-volume bankruptcy practice in 
imposing sanctions.  It is true that the bankruptcy judge noted 
that appellees were not the first attorneys to run into these 
sorts of difficulties in her court.  But she nonetheless made 
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individualized findings of wrong-doing after four days of 
hearings and issued sanctions thoughtfully chosen to prevent 
the recurrence of problems at the Udren Firm based on what 
she had learned of practices there.  Insofar as she considered 
the effect of the sanctions on the future conduct of other 
attorneys appearing before her, such considerations were 
permissible.  After all, “the prime goal [of Rule 11 sanctions] 
should be deterrence of repetition of improper conduct.”  
Waltz v. County of Lycoming, 974 F.2d 387, 390 (3d Cir. 
1992).   
 
 G. Conclusion 
 
We appreciate that the use of technology can save both 
litigants and attorneys time and money, and we do not, of 
course, mean to suggest that the use of databases or even 
certain automated communications between counsel and 
client are presumptively unreasonable.  However, Rule 11 
requires more than a rubber-stamping of the results of an 
automated process by a person who happens to be a lawyer.  
Where a lawyer systematically fails to take any responsibility 
for seeking adequate information from her client, makes 
representations without any factual basis because they are 
included in a “form pleading” she has been trained to fill out, 
and ignores obvious indications that her information may be 
incorrect, she cannot be said to have made reasonable inquiry.  
Therefore, we find that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its 
discretion in imposing sanctions on Doyle or the Udren Firm 
itself.  However, it did abuse its discretion in imposing 
sanctions on Udren individually.  
   
III. 
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For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court with respect to Doyle and the Udren Firm, affirming 
the bankruptcy court‟s imposition of sanctions.  With respect 
to HSBC, as discussed previously, the District Court lacked 
jurisdiction to reverse the sanctions, as do we; therefore, we 
vacate the District Court‟s order with respect to that party, 
leaving the sanctions imposed by the bankruptcy court in 
place.  We will affirm the District Court with respect to 
Udren individually, reversing the bankruptcy‟s court 
imposition of sanctions. 
 
   
 
     
